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Abstract:
This paper reports the results of an economic lab experiment designed to test the impact of Basic Income (BI)
on wages and productivity. The experimental design is based on the classic gift exchange game. Participants
assigned the role of employer were tasked with making wage offers, and those assigned as employees chose
how hard they would work in return. In addition to a control without any social security net, BI was compared
to unemployment benefits, and both types of cash transfers were tested at two levels. The results are that wage
offers were increased in both the BI and unemployment benefit treatments compared to the control. The higher-
level BI treatment also significantly increased effort. Further experimentation could shed more light on how
the potential extra value created in the labor market through increased productivity would be divided between
employers and employees.
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Numerous trials and studies on Basic Income (BI) or policies resembling it have been conducted in the last
50 years, and new field experiments have been cropping up in recent years especially. Even so, there does not
seem to be any overarching consensus about the effects of a BI policy on the labor market. The existing em-
pirically collected information is better fit to answer more narrow questions (Widerquist, 2018), and in general
it is difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions from past research projects. Perhaps the biggest hurdle is the
unobservability of long-term and dynamic effects in experimental designs with fixed durations and geograph-
ically dispersed test subjects (Calnitsky, 2019). This is not to say that field experiments do not have their own
considerable advantages. Rather than dismiss the valuable research already conducted, I aim to complement it
with economic laboratory experiments.
Economic lab experiments usually entail tasking human participants with playing a game in a monitored
computer lab. A financial incentive is created by rewarding participants with cash according to their success.
When other relevant factors mimic reality well enough, hypotheses about behavior in the real world can be
made based on the results. As pointed out by Noguera and De Wispelaere (2006) who argue that lab exper-
iments should be conducted to investigate BI, laboratory experiments are also less susceptible to politically
motivated manipulation and noise from uncontrolled variables than field studies. Furthermore, the authors
suggest that experiments could be used to investigate specific behavioral and psychological aspects of how a
BI would possibly affect decision-making in society.
Another specific advantage of lab experiments over field experiments in BI research is that it is possible to
keep the variable of interest, a simulated BI scheme, constant over an experimental session and uniform for
all participants. The main drawback in this methodology is the fact that participants are not observed in their
natural environments, and some factors present in real life will always be missing from the design. This is, of
course, the most important advantage of field experiments. Due to their opposing strengths and weaknesses, I
suggest that combining knowledge from field experiments and laboratory experiments is currently the best we
can do to estimate the impact of BI without full-scale implementation of the policy.
Yet, tomy knowledge, there has been only one published experiment on the labormarket impact of BI. In this
experiment, Haigner, Höchtl, Jenewein, Schneider, andWakolbinger (2012) studied the effect of a BI scheme on
labor supply. Participants could earn money by completing small computerized tasks. The researchers found
that a BI treatment, in which participants received a uniform lump sum of 15 euros and ‘wages’ were heavily
taxed, did not significantly affect the number of tasks completed compared to a scenario without a cash transfer
policy. For the research reported here, I designed an experiment where not only labor supply, but also labor
demand and wages were allowed to vary according participants’ decisions. This way, dynamic effects between
these factors could be observed. The final design is a modified version of the classic gift exchange experiment
(Fehr, Kirchsteiger, & Riedl, 1993).
VeeraAmanda Jokipalo is the corresponding author.
© 2019Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.
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BI and labormarket behavior
This section first presents a framework to approach the potential impact of BI on labor market behavior. Focus
is given to the behavior of employees, especially labor supply decisions. First, to see why an economist’s gut
feeling is that BI would decrease labor supply, consider Figure 1. A worker’s decision to enter the labor market
will depend on how well they are compensated for the loss of leisure time, as both leisure and consumption
possibilities are important to the individual. The budget line (dark blue) plots the combinations of consumption
and leisure time attainable, as dictated by the hourly wage and other sources of income. Each indifference curve
(green) plots combinations of consumption and leisure between which the worker is indifferent. If these indif-
ference curves represent true preferences of workers, and all else is held constant, an increase in non-labor
income – such as a BI transfer – results in a reduction in working hours. This is because the worker chooses
the point where their budget line meets the highest possible indifference curve. As the budget line is shifted
upward (indicated with grey arrows), the worker makes a move from l*1 to l*2, simultaneously increasing both
consumption and leisure. It seems obvious that people would choose such an unequivocal improvement. Yet,
there exist competing predictions of the impact of BI on the labor market, even among economists. This is ul-
timately not surprising, as the impact depicted in Figure 1 depends on a number of specific assumptions not
universally agreed upon.
Figure 1: Impact of basic income on labor supply.
Determining the shape of the indifference curves
The indifference curves depicted in Figure 1 are shaped with the assumption that on average, people dislike
paid work and want as much consumption (income) and leisure time as possible. This does not seem like a
completely outrageous assumption.However, the exact shape of the indifference curves has a significant bearing
on labor supply decisions, and it cannot be defined without a more detailed assessment: If people dislike labor
on average, how strongly do they feel about it? At what point is a ten-euro increase in income or a ten-minute
increase in leisure vital, and when does it become negligible? It is also noteworthy that average preferences do
not relay the whole picture: different groups can have different preferences and, as a result, different reactions
to a BI policy.
The idea of people enjoying work goes against an economist’s intuition to define paid labor as something
that is not desirable – after all, why else would people demand wages in exchange for their effort? This can
be countered with empirical evidence. For example, studies on win-for-life lottery winners show that even an
indefinite source of adequate non-labor income does not suppress all willingness to work (Marx & Peeters,
2008). Such a decision can be made because of improved social status, social relations in the workplace, or
finding one’s job meaningful, to give a few examples.
Work in and of itself is of course not necessarily beneficial or enjoyable for everyone, and some jobs can be
downright detrimental to wellbeing. Instead, some may prefer to work because labor supply decisions are not
made in a vacuum, but in anticipation of the future. A person’s wage-earning ability may be low today, say, for
2
Brought to you by | TAMPERE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
Authenticated
Download Date | 2/13/20 10:19 AM
Au
tom
ati
ca
lly
ge
ne
rat
ed
ro
ug
hP
DF
by
Pr
oo
fCh
eck
fro
m
Riv
er
Va
lle
yT
ec
hn
olo
gie
sL
td
DEGRUYTER Jokipalo
lack of experience, but participation in the labor market today may bring considerable benefits tomorrow – and
vice versa, choosing to exit the labor force can be detrimental if a person wished to re-enter later on (see e. g.
Birnbaum&Wispelaere, 2016). The hope of a better future might make a person less willing to give upworking
hours today. Relying on a BI transfer and forgoing such future benefits may still be a tempting option for those
who strongly discount future welfare.
Finally, time spent outside of paid work is not quite as ‘leisurely’ for everyone, as many spend this extra
time in unpaid work instead. They may be more likely to reduce working hours to either increase time spent
on unpaid work, or increase leisure, as their actual leisure is much scarcer and thus more valuable to them.1
Others may generally require more downtime due to issues such as high stress levels or long-term illness, or
need more income simply to cover their basic needs due to circumstances like high costs of health care.
Preferences can, to some extent, be deduced by observing behavior under different circumstances. Separat-
ing between similar effects of disliking labor and enjoying leisure is certainly a challenge to research design, but
not technically impossible. However, if BI were to change preferences, for example through weakening social
norms regarding work, the issue becomes ever more complicated.
Determining the shape of the budget line
The second part of the equation, the budget line, is perhaps simpler to determine, but also affected by several
factors that must be considered simultaneously. Importantly, we must consider how the shape and positioning
of the line would change as a BI policy is implemented in a given economy. Firstly, this is affected by other pre-
and post-BI social policy measures. This includes policies such as unemployment benefits, social assistance
and tax credits which are unlikely to remain completely unchanged if BI is implemented. The shape of the
budget line would be impacted especially at the point where working hours are at zero or very little above
that. Secondly, the tax system should be considered. Taxation of both labor and non-labor income can have a
considerable impact on disposable income, which is what the individual considers whenmaking their decision.
Thirdly, specifics of the BI policy, especially the size of the transfer, can change the level of the budget line
significantly.
Fourthly, if wages were to change as BI is implemented, potential income from labor would change (all else
held equal). In a free economy, wages are theoretically determined by demand and supply of labor only. Reality
is somewhat complex in that all three factors can be changed independently and affect each other dynamically.
This accentuates the need for research on long-term and dynamic effects of BI. For example, if BI were to boost
demand for goods and services in the economy through increasing the purchasing power of the poor (in a
Keynesian vein), this could result in an increase in labor demand and thus wages and, in turn, labor supply.
The possibility of BI having a direct impact on wages is central to my research and is explored further in the
rest of this section.
BI, labor supply, andwages: Theory and empirical evidence
A meta-study on the labor supply response in BI field experiments has recently been published by Gilbert,
Murphy, Stepka, Barrett, andWorku (2018). Pooling together all applicable datasets, the impact on labor supply
was not statistically significant. The preliminary results from Finland, published too late to be included in the
analysis of Gilbert et al., have come upwith a similar result; no statistically significant difference in labor supply
(Kangas, Jauhiainen, Simanainen, & Ylikännö, 2019). Notably, not all these experiments are directly comparable
due to difference in design and the societies in which they were conducted, and they carry the usual drawbacks
of field experiments, nearly always lacking the ability to study long-term and dynamic effects. Studies on win-
for-life lottery winners (Marx & Peeters, 2008) are certainly long-term, but do not offer a view into dynamic
effects. The Mincome experiment in Dauphin offered a BI transfer to all residents of a small town but was not
long-term.
There is evidence of wages increasing in the Mincome experiments (Calnitsky & Latner, 2017). The fact that
the Mincome experiment entailed cash transfers available to all eligible residents lends some support to gener-
alizing this result despite other experiments not reporting such effects. For example, in the Finnish experiment,
those receiving BI transfers were not found to have different wages from the control group (Kangas et al., 2019).
This suggests that if wages were to be increased, it would likely be due to dynamic effects. Why this would be
remains a question unanswered through empirical investigation but explored to some extent theoretically.
Perhaps the most popular hypothesis is that BI would improve the bargaining power or workers, either
as individuals or as collective actors in trade unions. If BI could bolster collective action by serving as an in-
exhaustible strike fund, unions might be able to negotiate for higher wages and better conditions overall. As
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pointed out in Calnitsky (2018), this may not be the case if people are currently involved in collective action
only because they have no other option. But even if the improved position in negotiations only applied to in-
dividuals, there could be an increase in average wages. The potential increase in negotiation power is usually
attributed to the ‘exit option’ or the ‘power to say no’, meaning that people would be able to decline atrocious
labor contracts and rely on BI transfers instead as they wait for a better offer (Widerquist, 2013). If the effect is
individual, inequalities may result; Birnbaum and Wispelaere (2016) posit that those in most vulnerable posi-
tions in the labor market would not enjoy such an improved bargaining position, but rather have the option
to either stick with their current jobs or make way for those willing to take them. In contradiction, Pech (2010)
has suggested that wages would decrease for coveted jobs and increase for those with less appeal. This would
result from the fact that with BI, people are less dependent on wages to make ends meet and can afford to
choose professions they enjoy; and some jobs are more universally appealing than others.
Increased labor supply, measured through the employment rate of average number of hours worked, is
not the only way BI may influence the total amount of work performed. Another possible channel is through
productivity. An increase in productivity could theoretically take place through improved welfare. The pos-
itive impact of BI on health, especially mental health, is perhaps the most widely observed result from field
experiments to date (see e. g. Beck, Pulkki-Brännström, & San Sebastián, 2015; Forget, 2011; Kangas et al., 2019).
This improvement in welfare could translate into not only higher productivity at work, but also increased labor
supply. As noted by Van der Veen (2019), BI may increase labor supply indirectly by reducing cognitive load
on the poor, as they no longer need to spend as much mental energy simply to make ends meet (such effects of
poverty have been studied in Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao, 2013). The final part of this section considers
a gift exchange behavior as another specific channel through which BI could impact productivity.
Gift exchangebehavior
George Akerlof (1982) famously asserts that some labor contracts implicitly include partial gift exchange. This
means that employers sometimes offer higher wages than would be necessary to fill vacancies because they
believe employees will reciprocate with higher effort than necessary to keep their jobs. The goal is thus higher
production per dollar paid in wages. Employees might also increase effort in hopes that this will be rewarded
by better wages. In other words, gift exchange behavior can be summarized as a reciprocal relationship where
employers pay wages above market-clearing and employees exert effort over the minimum requirement. If we
accept the notion that gift exchange occurs in the labor market, the theory offers both a baseline for explaining
behavior that does not follow basic economic theory, and one channel through which BI could impact behavior
in the labor market in general. Notably, similar effects could sometimes be elicited by conditional transfers such
as unemployment benefits, which are already place in many societies; it is important to compare BI not only to
a lack of social security, but also to the status quo.
In the gift exchange model, employees consider the wages paid elsewhere as well as benefits paid to the un-
employed to compare their ownwages against. According to this, they decidewhether they are being paid fairly.
According to the fair wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof & Yellen, 1990), an employee’s perception
of a fair wage influences their effort level: a person paid less thanwhat they think is fair will decrease their effort
proportionately. Employers can thus potentially make gains from offering wages higher than market-clearing,
up to a ‘fair wage’, as effort is not increased beyond this point. Unless the employer can freely adjust wages
over time, they will need to make an educated guess as to what employees perceive as fair.
In the model, high unemployment benefits push fair wage perceptions upward; the impact of BI has not, to
my knowledge, been studied or hypothesized. In general, the impact of BI is ambiguous. If employees take into
consideration that a BI transfer is eventually paid for in taxes by those who are employed, the effect may be very
similar. Employers may also anticipate that an employeewho receives such a transfer might be less appreciative
of wage increases, as they make less of a difference in total income: this can induce them to pay higher wages,
if efficiency is still improved. This could boost gift exchange behavior. On the other hand, employers may feel
that it is only fair to pay employees less when they already receive non-labor income. Lastly, it may be that an
unconditional, universal transfer systemwould induce a widespread conviction that such generosity should be
reciprocated by citizens (Van der Veen, 2019). Not engaging in paid work or other activities that benefit society
would then leave people with a nagging sense of indebtedness that they resolve by engaging in paid work.
Generous unemployment benefits or social security nets may have similar impact.
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Experimental design
Five experimental sessions were run at the Autonomous University of Barcelona in April 2018. A total of 80
university students were recruited from the LACESS laboratory’s participant pool, and 76 showed up on time.
Upon arrival, participants were assigned a seat in a computer lab2 and tasked with playing a game with a fixed
partner, one playing the part of employer, and one the employee. In the game, employers madewage offers, and
employees decided whether they would work for the offered wage, and if so, how hard they would work. The
only difference between sessions were the BI and conditional transfer (CT) treatments; the control session had
no social security net. The aim was to generate information about the impact of BI on gift exchange behavior
– that is, potential changes in wage offers, effort exerted, and the way wages and effort affect each other under
different settings.
The design is based on the classic gift exchange experiment (Fehr et al., 1993). Themost important modifica-
tions made for the study at hand are real effort, real leisure, and a repeated game format. This means that employees
did not indicate hypothetical effort by choosing a number from 0 to 10 as in the original gift exchange experi-
ment, but by completing small tasks (real effort). They were also allowed to use the internet when not working
(real leisure), as opposed to being constrained to either working or doing nothing. Real effort and real leisure
addmore realistic elements to the game. Participants also knew beforehand that theywould playwith the same
person in all rounds (repeated game format). This allows for an analysis of a continuous relationship where
both parties may act in more pro-social ways to ensure better profits in the future. The exact research questions
were as follows:
1. Does a simulated BI affect A. wages, B. offers, or C. the interaction of wages and offers in the gift exchange
game?
2. Are these effects different from conditional transfers?
3. Does the size of the transfer make a difference?
Designdetails
Eight identical rounds were played in all sessions. At the beginning of each round, the employer could offer the
employee a wage ranging from 0 to 120 experimental currency units (ECU). The employee could then decide
whether to accept the offer. Those who accepted their offer had four minutes to solve up to 10 encryption tasks
(coded and freely shared by Benndorf, Rau, & Sölch, 2018). The encryption tasks were repetitive and required
no previous knowledge. During the four-minute working period, employees (and employers) were free to surf
the internet or otherwise relax, given that they did not disturb other participants. Participants were shown a
log of past rounds before the next round began. After playing all rounds but before receiving their payment,
subjects filled out an end survey.3 The English version of instructions given to participants are included as
Appendix A.
For the control setting, payoff (𝜋) functions were
𝜋 = 𝑣 ∗ 0.1𝑒 − 𝑤 (1)
for the employer, and
𝜋 = 𝑤 − 𝑐 − (𝐸 − 1) (2)
for the employee in each round. These functions applied when a labor contract was formed: an offer was made
and accepted, and the minimum requirement of one correctly completed task was met by the employee. In the
functions, v is the maximum value (120 ECU) produced through labor; e is the number of correctly completed
tasks; w is the wage (minimum 0, maximum 120 ECU); c is the baseline cost of work (20 ECU); and E is the
total number of attempts to solve a task. Expressed verbally, both players’ profits were impacted by the wage
as well as the effort levels chosen, as is consistent with previous applications of the gift exchange experiment.
Employers reap the value produced through labor and pay the promised wage. For employees, points were
earned through wages. Each attempt to solve a task costs the employee one ECU except for the first attempt
of each round, which is free of monetary cost. Baseline cost of work, set at 20 ECU, represents costs such as
commuting or acquiring work-appropriate clothing. The payoff functions are adapted from Fehr et al. (1993).
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Whenever participants were faced with a decision, they were provided with a tailor-made calculator to see
what outcomes would possible for each party.
In the BI treatments, all employees received 10 (BI10) or 20 (BI20) ECU per round in addition to whatever
their earnings were otherwise. In the conditional transfer treatments employees also received 10 (CT10) or 20
(CT20) ECU, but only if they did not accept a wage offer, or an offer was not made in the first place. All five
payoff functions for employees are presented in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Payoff functions for employees by treatment (π =).
Setting Offer made and accepted, e > 0 All other cases
Control w – c – (E – 1) 0
BI10 w – c – (E – 1) + 10 10
BI20 w – c – (E – 1) + 20 20
CT10 w – c – (E – 1) 10
CT20 w – c – (E – 1) 20
Hypotheses
Note that in the BI treatment, extra points are added to employee’s payoffs regardless of their choices. There is
thus no specific incentive to behave differently under the treatment. It is possible that employees could interpret
the BI transfer as a gift and, unable to reciprocate this gift to the experiment directly, increase their effort level
instead. Thosewho are averse to inequalitymay also increase effort levels to share the benefit of the extra points.
Similarly, employers may feel that it is only fair to pay employees less when they already receive extra points.
Yet again, they may anticipate that an employee who receives extra points may need a higher wage offer to
motivate them to work. Due to such opposing forces potentially influencing behavior, a null hypothesis is used
here.4
Hypothesis 1. Neither BI treatment will result in changes in behavior.
Unemployment benefits, on the other hand, act as an additional cost of working to employees: the benefit is lost
when accepting a job. Thus, similar wage offers would be less enticing in the CT treatments compared to the
control, and less effort would be exerted in return. Predicting this, employers might make higher offers than
they would otherwise. As for interpreting wages as gifts, I anticipate there are two possible responses. Some
participants may be inclined to see identical wages as equally generous regardless of the treatment, considering
only the offer size itself. Others may appreciate an identical wage offer less in the CT treatment compared to
the control, as the final profit for the employee is lower. If both types of participants are present in the sample,
the average person would interpret a wage offer in the CT treatment as less valuable in terms of gifts than they
would in the control setting. Theywould then reciprocatewith a less valuable gift themselves, decreasing effort.
As for the reactions of employers, the reverse is likely true. As the cost of accepting an offer is higher, a lower
level of effort could be interpreted as a gift; or this cost could be disregarded, only taking mind of the benefits
to the employer, which remain unchanged. The average person would then interpret the gift of effort as more
valuable in the CT treatment, reciprocating with a higher offer than they would otherwise. Both effects would
likely be stronger when the transfer is larger.
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris paribus, wage offers will be higher and effort will be lower in the CT treatments in comparison
to the control setting.
Hypothesis 3. The effects will be stronger for the CT20 treatment than the CT10 treatment.
Analysis and results
Description of the data
The mean age of participants was 22.1 and the gender division roughly equal. One in four participants had
attained a bachelor’s degree. On average, political stance was slightly leaning to the left at 5.0 on a scale of 1
to 10. Average earnings in the experiment were 22.95 euros, including a 12 euro show-up fee, and sessions ran
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for approximately 90 to 120 minutes. Out of a theoretical maximum of 304 interactions (38 employer-employee
pairs each playing eight rounds) a total of 279 observations were included in the final analysis.5 An interaction
refers to choices made in one round: a wage offer made, and an effort level chosen in response. Due to the small
sample sizes and potential selection bias, there were some differences between treatment groups, which were
considered when running analyses. All data analysis was run using the R Statistics software.
Gift exchangebehavior in the experiment
As has been established, gift exchange behavior is expressed through reciprocating high wages with high effort
and vice versa. The gift exchange relationship must first be initiated by one party. To investigate whether such
behavior occurred in the experiment, gift exchange behavior was first defined as a “yes or no” variable (dummy
variable). A wage offer only counted as a gift when it was higher than the minimum required to enable positive
payoffs for the employee6; effort levels were interpreted as gifts when they exceeded theminimum requirement
of one correctly completed task.
Table 2 shows the proportion of wage offers and effort levels thus qualifying as gifts in each treatment.
In total, around 70 % of both offers made and effort exerted are interpreted as gifts. Approximately 60 % of
all interactions in the experiments were characterized by mutual gift exchange, where an offer higher than
predictedwas reciprocatedwith effort higher than 1. The BI treatments havemorewage offers qualifying as gifts
than either the control or CT treatments. In both treatment types there are more instances of effort exceeding
the minimum requirement than in the control setting. Mutual gift exchange was also more common in both
treatments types when compared to the control. Here, the BI treatments show a much larger difference than
the CT treatments.
Table 2: Proportion of interactions exhibiting gift exchange behavior by treatment.
Offers above threshold Effort above threshold Mutual gift exchange
Control 66 % 54 % 44 %
BI10 77 % 74 % 70 %
BI20 88 % 77 % 75 %
CT10 65 % 73 % 56 %
CT20 66 % 71 % 59 %
Total 72 % 69 % 61 %
Table 3 and Table 4 providemore information about wages and effort in each treatment, featuring themean and
median wage offers and effort levels as well as their correlation with each other. (The correlation coefficients
are different because for offers, the effort level considered is from the previous round.) The control showsmuch
lower levels of effort and offers than other settings, while differences between the four treatment groups are
smaller. Highest offers are observed in the BI20 and CT20 treatments, and the lowest among treatment groups
in CT10.
Table 3:Mean and median effort levels and correlation with offer by treatment.
Treatment Mean Median Correlation with offer
Control 3,0 3,0 0,65
BI10 4,7 5,0 0,78
BI20 5,1 6,0 0,37
CT10 4,5 5,0 0,55
CT20 4,5 5,0 0,59
Total 4,4 5,0 0,61
Table 4:Mean and median offers and correlation with lagged effort by treatment.
Treatment Mean Median Correlation with effort
Control 38,5 42.0 0,38
BI10 45,1 45,0 0,45
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BI20 46,4 45,0 0,22
CT10 40,6 42,0 0,41
CT20 46,5 46,0 0,55
Total 43,4 45,0 0,43
All in all, both treatment types are connected tomore frequent expressions of gift exchange behavior, and larger
transfers seem to elicit a larger difference. Interestingly, there is also a difference in correlations between wage
offers and the following effort level. To be exact, the BI10 treatment shows a stronger correlation between offers
and effort than average, and the reverse is true for the BI20 treatment. This is explored further in the next
subsection.
Regression analysis
The tables in the last subsection communicate the results in a simple fashion. This subsection explores the rela-
tionship between treatments and behavior with a more fine-grained approach. First, two simple linear regres-
sions with offers and effort as the respective dependent variables, and the treatments as independent variables,
were run. The results are reported in the first columns of Table 5 and Table 6. The results are not statistically
significant other than for the CT treatments significantly increasing effort by approximately 1.5more tasks com-
pleted per round. The effect on offers is not statistically significant for any treatment with this model, and the
F-statistic is also not significant.7
Table 5: Regressions on effort levels with random effects and interaction terms.
Intercept 3.02 (0.42)*** 3.09 (0.29)*** 0.184 (0.36)
BI10 1.70 (0.59)** 1.56 (0.39)*** 0.114 (0.50)
BI20 2.13 (0.62)*** 2.05 (0.42)*** 3.09 (0.57)***
CT10 1.48 (0.64)* 1.25 (0.43)** 0.785 (0.61)
CT20 1.49 (0.60)* 1.30 (0.40)** 0.354 (0.55)
Offer – – 0.068 (0.01)***
BI10*Offer – – 0.024 (0.02)**
BI20*Offer – – −0.028 (0.01)**
CT10*Offer – – 0.009 (0.01)
CT20*Offer – – 0.004 (0.01)
Random effects No Yes Yes
Residual s.e. 3.19 3.19 2.54
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.036 0.390
F-statistic 3.50 ** 3.44 ** 19.48 ***
DF 260 260 255
Table 6: Regressions on offer sizes with random effects and interaction terms.
Intercept 38.53 (3.16)*** 39.63 (0.24)*** 32.0 (0.28)***
BI10 6.52 (4.42) 5.42 (0.34)*** 5.52 (0.40)***
BI20 7.91 (4.77) 6.81 (0.37)*** 10.65 (0.48)***
CT10 2.06 (4.77) 0.955 (0.37)*** 1.88 (0.44)***
CT20 7.96 (4.57) 6.85 (0.35)*** 6.74 (0.41)***
Effort in t-1 – – 2.73 (0.05)***
BI10*Effort – – −0.367 (0.07)***
BI20*Effort – – −1.89 (0.08)***
CT10*Effort – – −1.16 (0.08)***
CT20*Effort – – −0.74 (0.07)***
Random effects No Yes Yes
Residual s.e. 24.71 24.72 21.51
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.003 0.175
F-statistic 1.2 1.18 5.94***
DF 272 272 232
The analysis was then refinedwith a random effects model.8 This corrects for bias caused by the fact that one indi-
vidual generatesmultiple observations (resulting in so-called autocorrelated error terms, which pose a problem
8
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for estimating regression coefficients). The new regression models are presented in the middle columns of Ta-
ble 5 and Table 6. It is immediately noticeable that all four treatments seem to have a statistically significant and
positive effect of both offers and effort. The F-statistic for the model on offers is still not significant, meaning
that the share of variation explained by the model is still very small. This changes when interaction effects are
included in the model.
Interaction effects are the effects of two variables in conjunction. Here, they refer to the effect of the behavior
of the other player in their previous turn and belonging to a certain treatment group. Such effects are of interest
as they are at the heart of exploring differences in gift exchange behavior caused by treatments. In this model,
the effect of wage offers in general is an increase of 0.068 more tasks completed per round, per a unit increase
in the wage offer. The effect of belonging to the BI20 treatment group is an increase of 3.09 task completed
per round. The interaction effect of belonging to the BI20 group and having received a particular wage offer is
−0.028; this means that the effect of offers is weaker than in the other treatment groups, although still positive
in total (0.068 – 0.028 = 0.040). For BI10, the model suggests that reciprocal reactions to offers are stronger than
in other treatments. In the CT treatments, there seems to be no difference compared to the control.
Noticeably, the treatment effects for BI10, CT10 and CT20 on effort are greatly reduced and lose significance
after including offers and interaction effects in the model. This seems to be because the difference in effort
is mostly connected to offer size instead of treatment. The BI20 treatment is an exception to this, exhibiting
3.09 more tasks completed per round compared to the control. The regression coefficients for treatment effects
could also be biased towards zero due to overadjustment bias: this means that if the treatment caused a change
in offer sizes, which in turn cause a change in effort, some of the effect of the treatment will be masked by
controlling for offers. Due to the importance of interaction effects, this is an inevitable trade-off. Nevertheless,
as the coefficients maintain a positive sign for all treatments, positive treatment effects could potentially be
confirmed with a larger sample.
For wage offers, all coefficients in the third column are highly significant and carry the same interpretation:
all treatment groups have a higher baseline for wage offers than the control group, but the impact of effort
levels on following offers is weaker for all treatments. This difference is again most prominent in the BI20
treatment, where a unit increase in effort in the previous round increases offer size by only 2.73 – 1.89 = 0.84
units. Nevertheless, the effect of effort on offers is present and positive in all treatments, meaning that high
effort in the previous round still predicts higher offers in the current round. As for the baseline, offers in all
treatments are higher than in the control, with the 20-unit transfers having a much larger increase: the BI20
treatment exhibits offers more than 10 units higher than in the control, compared to 5.52 for the BI10 treatment.
For the CT treatments, these figures are 6.74 and 1.88 for CT20 and CT10 respectively.
Discussion
According to the analysis, gift exchange behavior was altered by the treatments applied. Baselines for offers
and effort were higher in all four treatments. This would indicate a stronger tendency for gift exchange behav-
ior. However, the heart of gift exchange theory is that higher wages and effort levels are part of a reciprocal
relationship. It seems that for offers, the impact of past effort is in fact diminished by all four treatments. As for
effort, the results vary: the BI10 treatment exhibits a stronger tendency to increase effort according to the wage
offer, whereas the BI20 treatment shows a weaker tendency. Neither CT treatment seems to make a difference
in this aspect.
One potential explanation for gift exchange behavior being so affected in the experiment is precisely the
much higher baselines. That is, as neither effort or offers can increase indefinitely, most of the room for change
could have been taken up by the initial increase. In line with this, the treatment where reciprocity in effort
is strengthened compared to the control – BI10 – also shows a very small increase on the baseline. Another
mechanism through which perceptions of wages may change with BI is anchoring. Anchoring refers to the
effect on behavior from having seen a number related to the decision at hand. For example, if a salesman offers
you a pair of shoes for $100, and then another for $50, the second pair seems cheaper than if you had first been
shown a pair that costs $20. People could be consciously or subconsciously comparing wage offers to their BI
transfer. This could affect their perceptions of fair wages – for example, some may rule any wage under the BI
transfer as too low to be fair. Both higher baselines and anchoring could occur in real life labor markets as well.
Another factor possibly influencing behavior is inequity aversion. A person averse to inequity dislikes an
uneven share of points, either in all cases, when they themselves profit less than others, or only when others
profit less. With the BI transfer, employees gain more from an interaction than in the control, other things
held equal. Employers had no such benefit. In the CT treatments, employees who reject an offer gain larger
payoffs than their partners, which participants may also find objectionable. However, if employers in the BI
9
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treatments wished to balance payoffs, they could have made lower offers; this did not happen. If employees
chose to increase effort to ‘even out the playing field’, this would likely result in higher baseline effort and
a weaker impact of offers on effort. This only happens in the BI20 treatment. All things considered, I do not
believe inequity aversion has considerably polluted the results.
Implications
My results do not support the idea that BI would result in lower labor supply. In fact, there was a statistically
insignificant difference between ‘employment rates’ in favor of the BI and CT treatments against the control.
The results are also not in line with those of Haigner et al. (2012), where effort was not increased by a BI policy.
This difference is potentially caused by the fact that in their design, wages could not vary. The boost in effort
levels in the BI20 treatment especially also suggests that BI transfers could inspire employees to exert more
effort in their jobs. This points to productivity being improved with the implementation of a BI policy.
The extra value created through work would not necessarily be reaped by society as a whole, but rather
employers may benefit most from this effect. When productivity is increased, employers may hire fewer people
to perform jobs, such as has happened with automation. If this leads to sharing work, or paid labor being
performed by those with the least distaste for it, this can arguably be good for society (in a system where the
unemployed are provided for). However, if labor supply is indeed not diminished at the same time, wages
may be adjusted downward. This does not necessarily mean wages will plummet – even with relatively high
involuntary unemployment, those lucky enough to have jobs are still often paid high wages. If the hypothesis
of BI producing an upward pressure on wages from workers’ improved bargaining power is correct, or if labor
demand is increased throughBI providing a boost to the economy,wage decreases could ultimately be cancelled
out. My results showwage offers increasing in size with both BI and CT treatments, especially with higher-level
transfers. This result should be put under pressure by introducing competition for jobs.
In the experiment, BI boosted offers and effort more than did CT’s, but CT was also a significant change to
the control which lacked social security nets. This accentuates the need to estimate the impact of implementing
BI in comparison to the system currently in place. Ceteris paribus, societies with very generous social policy
measures are less likely to see a big difference from BI. This is useful to keep in mind when assessing results
from field experiments in different countries. Differences were also detected between cash transfers of different
sizes, underlining the importance of careful experimental and policy design: size matters. A study conducted
with a partial BI design may not yield much information about the impact of a full BI.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a laboratory experiment designed to investigate the impact of BI on wages and pro-
ductivity. The design is based on the classic gift exchange experiment, featuring a repeated game format, a
real-effort task with an option of real leisure, and two types of cash transfer treatments: conditional (CT) and
unconditional (BI), simulated by extra points awarded to the employee. Both treatments were applied in two
levels for transfers, 10ECU and 20ECU. All participants were subjected to only one treatment or the control
setting. The subjects were 76 students of the Autonomous University of Barcelona who participated in one of
five experimental sessions in April 2018, resulting in a total 279 observations of interactions over eight rounds.
The results indicate that a BI policy may have the capacity to inspire employees to exert more effort at
their jobs, which improves productivity. This benefit can be reaped by employers, who can decrease demand
for human labor or decrease wages. Other dynamic effects of BI on labor market behavior may cancel out the
negative impact. The differing results between BI and CT treatments as well as between different sized transfers
underline the need for careful experimental andpolicy design. In this experiment,wageswere increased by both
BI and CT treatments compared to the control. For effort, there is a robust result that effort was increased by
the BI20 treatment, and more experiments with a larger sample size may confirm such an effect for the other
treatments. These results should be put under stress by introducing more realistic circumstances to the design.
For example, the addition of competition for jobs could shed light on who would reap the benefits of increased
productivity.
As has been discussed in this paper, the impact of BI should be studied in terms of changes to the status quo,
which does not often entail the complete lack of a social security net. Comparisons between BI and different
policies such as Negative Income Tax, and regulations such as minimum wages would also be useful in terms
of policy designwhere several options for policy reform are being considered. Lastly, it is possible that there are
subject group differences in reactions to BI due to different values and life experiences on average in different
societies. To confirm generalizability to different populations, similar experiments could be run in different
10
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countries andwith participants including non-students. Further inspection into differences in behavior between
groups such as men and women can also yield a more detailed picture of the impact of BI on labor market
behavior when not only an average effect is of interest.
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Appendix
A INSTRUCTIONS (FOREMPLOYERS, CONTROLSESSION)
Welcome to the study!
Please, put your phone on silent, and do not communicate with anyone in the room.
If you need help, raise your hand, and we will assist you.
 
Your role in the study.
You have been randomly assigned the role of employee.
Another participant has been randomly assigned as your employer.
In the study, employers can make wage offers, and employees can work by solving tasks.
Your earnings in the study depend on your decisions and your employer’s decisions.
Your employer remains the same for the duration of the study, but their identity will not be revealed to you at
any point.
 
Procedure.
The study consists of several rounds.
Each round consists of three phases.
In the 1st phase, you canmake awage offer to your employee. (Thewage offermust be awhole number between
0 and 120)
In the 2nd phase, your employee can accept or reject the offer.
In the 3rd phase, If the employee accepts the offer and can works by solving a task.
 
The third phase lasts four minutes. During this phase,
Employees can
– work by solving an encryption task 1–10 times,
– dowhatever else theywish, like browsing the internet or checking their phone (without communicatingwith
anyone in the room or making noise), or
– alternate between working and not working.
Employers can
– use the four minutes as they wish (without communicating with anyone in the room or making noise).
You can press theWindows-button to access the desktop at any time. Please, return to the study when the third
stage ends. The monitors will notify you of the time.
 
Accumulating points.
Your earnings are represented by points.
Points depend on the wage offer and number of tasks solved.
The employer receives 12 points for each task the employee completes correctly, if the employee solves at least
one task the offered wage to the employee.
11
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The employee receives the wage. The cost of working is 20 points for the employee. An attempt to solve a task,
successful or failed, costs one additional point (the first attempt is free of cost).
If the employer makes no wage offer, the employee rejects the offer, or does not solve any tasks correctly, both
gain zero points for the round.
Cost Benefit
Employer Wage 12 x solved tasks
Employee −20 – (attempts to solve a
task −1)
Wage
For convenience, you are provided with a calculator in stages where you make decisions so that it may help
you take decisions.
 
Points and earnings.
At the end of the game, your total points are converted to euros and you are paid in cash.
The conversion rate is 25/1, meaning that 25 points are worth one euro.
Earnings are rounded to the nearest ten cents.
Both you and your employee start with 125 points.
If you ever go below 0 points, you are bankrupt and you and your employee will be excluded from the rest of
the study. Youwill need to remain seated until the session is over. Your employee will be paid according to their
total points so far.
At the end of the session, a 12 € participation fee will be added to your earnings.
Example 1. If you have 475 points at the end of the game, you will receive 375/25 = 15 euros, plus the 12 €
participation fee, totaling 28 euros.
Example 2. If you have 50 points at the end of the game, you will receive 50/25 = 2 euros, plus the 12 € partici-
pation fee, totaling 14 euros.
Example 3. If you have less than 0 points at any point in the game, you will receive only the 12 € participation
fee.
Notes
1 In the NIT studies run in the US, for example, it was found that female family members decreased their labor supply the most (Levine
et al. 2005), suggesting that those with more unpaid responsibilities react more strongly to non-labor income.
2 The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
3 In addition to more standard socioeconomic information, such as age, gender, income and education level, some relevant questions from
the World Values Survey (Inglehart et al. 2014) were replicated.
4 If an effect were observed, the larger BI transfer would likely yield stronger but otherwise similar results. Another possibility is there is
a threshold value after which behavior is affected; in this case, the higher transfer could induce an effect, while the lower transfer would
not.
5 One participant showed a severe lack of understanding of the rules, and their data was not used. Data after bankruptcies was also
excluded from analysis. Participants whomade extreme losses were declared bankrupt to avoid a situation where participants would need
to pay back money the laboratory. They were not allowed to continue playing afterwards, and only received the show-up fee at the end of
the session. Out of 76 participants, two ended up bankrupt.
6 More than 21 for settings 1–3, more than 31 for setting 4, and more than 51 for setting 5; these offers are just high enough that employees
can make at least one point in the round.
7 The F-statistic is used to measure the statistical significance of a regression model. If the F-statistic is not statistically significant, it is
plausible that the true regression coefficient for all variables included in the model is zero.
8 Wallace-Hussain estimators and the ‘plm’ package in R statistics were used for this step.
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